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Preface 
 
This thesis is a consequence of a row of observations I have made recently. Once I remember 
when I shared my thoughts with a friend about electricity waste and lights turned on when it 
is unnecessary, she straight gave me an example of how her neighbor left a flat for travelling 
two weeks and left lights on. She was very disappointed, but she did not show any disapproval 
to this “careless” person. But could it have some effect if she did it (in a polite manner)? 
 
I want to thank the supervisor of my thesis, Professor Kjell Arne Brekke, for his important 
advices, theoretical consultation and assistantship throughout my work. His personal effort 
helped me to organize my ideas in a proper order and achieve great improvement in the 
analysis. In addition I want to show my gratitude to Professor Harold Wilhite at SUM (Center 
for Environment and Development) for providing interesting and motivating materials. All 
shortcomings of the thesis are a matter of my responsibility. 
 
Ismayil Jabiyev 
Oslo, May 2010 
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Summary 
 
One of the most challenging problems the humanity facing in the coming decades is 
exhaustion of fossil fuels and environmental consequences from burning them. While 
countries put investments in developing alternative energy sources, less fuel consuming 
devices and motors, the role of humans in energy consumption is often underestimated. 
Human is a complicated social actor, and his decision making regarding energy is formed not 
only by his individual preferences, but also by his social environment. At the same time there 
is a conflict between private and social interests that can bring failure in cooperation and 
considerable free-riding regarding pro-environmental actions. From this point of view this 
thesis aims at investigation of present achievements from behavioral economics and insights 
from allied sciences in order to analyze the potential of the environmental policies targeting at 
groups rather than individuals. For this purpose the results from public good experiments are 
provided in order to define basic conditions increasing the cooperation, followed by a 
theoretical model covering the social norm factor. The observations from the experiments and 
predictions from the model can have an implication for the policy makers designing an energy 
conservation or environmental friendliness campaign. 
The thesis is organized in the following manner: 
The Introduction chapter provides evidences from social sciences to illustrate various factors 
influencing human decision making. In chapter 1.3 features of social behavior are stated, 
especially the social proof and bandwagon effect (informational cascade) showing how we 
can be affected by the others’ behavior. It is also shown how the uncertainty about the right 
decision and the perceived similarity with others in the social environment can strengthen the 
mentioned effects. The chapter 1.4 illustrates how the groups are formed, and once they are, 
how strong can the group identity be to make people do even irrational decisions. 
In the Chapter 2 the problem of common resource exploitation (with reference to the energy 
conservation) is presented via classical game model of prisoner’s dilemma. The conflict 
between individual and group interests explains the individual’s incentives to free-ride. A link 
to the famous Tragedy of the Commons is being made as an example of a failure to exploit a 
common pool resource. But the uncooperative prediction can be amended once the social 
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factor is introduced. In sub-chapter 2.5 such element like reciprocity can bring players to 
cooperation. 
Chapter 3 provides results from various group experiments in order to describe conditions 
encouraging cooperation inside a group. The group size, partners and strangers format, 
communication factor and sanctioning mechanism are being discussed. The chapter 3.4 the 
importance of not crowding out the intrinsic motivation is touched, which has an important 
implication on policy design. Chapter 3.5 provides a dynamic model of public good game 
with an introduced social norm factor (conditional warm glow) and the morally accepted level 
of provision that dynamically changes and depends on average level of other’s provision, 
previous moral ideal and the external advice factor. The importance of social pressure factor 
and policy advice effect to achieve cooperation is stressed. 
On the basis of the results above I introduce the group-based environmental policy for the 
analysis in Chapter 4. The possibility of using the group approach for promotion of the energy 
conservation is shown on the neighborhood responsibility program. How the specific setting 
of a group can help to achieve a cooperation in terms of environmentally friendly behavior is 
being discusses with a link to the theoretical model and group experiments. 
Sub-chapter 4.6 provides description of the EcoTeam intervention program organized by the 
Global Action Plan organization. The team approach close to the discussed in the thesis is 
illustrated, and considerable improvement of the participants’ performance in terms of various 
environmental behaviors (energy consumption as well) is shown. The consistency of the 
EcoTeam program with the model predictions is discussed at the end. 
The Conclusion in Chapter 5 summarizes the potential of group approach and highlights its 
main advantage: expected long-lasting effect and opportunity to achieve permanent shift to 
environmentally friendly behavior. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Energy conservation 
 
Today’s world experiences a transformation period caused by exhaustion of fossil fuels, 
global warming caused (presumably) by the emissions of CO2 and other gases, problems of 
pollution and other cases closely related to the human economic activity.  Reduced energy 
consumption would make an important contribution to alleviating these problems, but at the 
same time the energy demand continues to grow fast. According to the projections of 
International Energy Outlook report 2009, total world consumption of marketed energy is 
projected to increase by 44 percent from 2006 to 2030. In such a type of situation a large 
effort is being made by governments and environmental agencies to control this growth and 
make people concern about the amount of energy they consume. 
 
The energy consumption in households takes an important place, as they stand for 25% of 
total energy requirements in the European Union (27 countries)1. Yet the dominating strategy 
in the past decades was much device-centered. As discussed in Wilhite et al. (2000)2
 
, in early 
80s the energy use was approached by scientists trained in engineering and physics, who were 
focused on development of more effective devices (lights, home equipment, motors etc.) and  
considered buildings rather than people as energy consumers. In Winett & Ester (1983) this 
physical design was criticized, as it ignores the importance of human behavior. As it was 
pointed out, the consumer life-style is probably the major determinant of energy use in US 
homes, and a major factor in European ones. 
Already in early studies3
                                                 
1 Eurostat, Final energy consumption, by sector, 2007 (provisional values) 
 it was shown that physically identical townhouses can vary in 
energy consumption by 2:1 ratio, presumably due to consumption style of residents. Though 
there were significant gains in energy efficiency over the intervening 20 years, the fact is that 
total energy demand in US and in most European countries actually increased. The possible 
explanation for this fact is that people’s demand for comfort and convenience has increased, 
(desire for higher living standards), which is supported by higher incomes. In the household 
2 Taken from E. Jochem et al. (2000) 
3 Socolow (1978) example is being used 
2 
 
sector the creation of new goods and services implies permanent growth of electricity 
consumption. Home appliances are becoming more efficient, at the same time there are more 
of them and they are being used more often4
 
. 
The idea of the rampant consumerism is closely connected to this process. For example in the 
research of Hille (1997) it was shown that though the doubled thermal efficiency of a 
Norwegian home from 1960 to 1980, the energy use for space heating increased due to 
doubling of per capita size of dwelling. 
 
In a recent research conducted in the American market5
 
, polling 1,006 consumers across the 
country, it was found out that 60 percent of Americans are looking for greener products, at the 
same time given a choice between their comfort, convenience or the environment, 38 percent 
of respondents said they would choose their convenience, 35 percent said they would choose 
comfort, only 26 percent said they would choose the environment. Another example from the 
survey is that given a question: “If you thought these things were harming environment, 
which of the following would you be willing to give up?” most Americans wouldn’t give up 
their iPod, microwave oven, air conditioning, cell phone or computer, even if they thought it 
harmed the environment. The survey did not provide relative prices of the choices, so the 
opportunity cost of selecting comfort and convenience in terms of environment was not 
clearly stated. Anyhow the question is that the information about environmental consequences 
of our behavior is quite wide-spread, yet in my opinion the individuals do not behave in a 
manner that could reveal their concern about it. 
The technological innovations and device-centered improvements at home aimed at reduction 
of energy consumption can bring even opposite results on account of omitting behavioral 
consequences of their application. In an interesting case indicating the effect of getting people 
actively involved in environmental activities was described in Hamrin (1979) where a 
comparison was made between two Californian suburbs: Blue Skies Radiant Homes 
(equipped with active solar energy systems and conservation facilities) and Village Homes 
(equipped with the same, but passive system, requiring residents’ active involvement in the 
                                                 
4 Data from European Environmental Agency, 
http://ims.eionet.europa.eu/Sectors_and_activities/households/indicators/energy 
5 June 23, 2009, Environment Takes Back Seat To Comfort, Convenience 
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2009/06/23/environment-takes-back-seat-to-comfort-convenience/ 
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conservation like closing shutters and setting thermostats). The result was that residents of 
Village homes consumed less energy than their more technologically sophisticated neighbors. 
Not changed life-style of the Blue Skies Radiant residents could be considered as the reason 
for this high level of consumption. 
 
The residential sector has been for a long time a target for state level energy conservation 
campaigns. The fact that consumers have energy consumption at excess over its socially 
optimal level can be explained in the way that the environmental consequences of it (like 
pollution, exhaustion of resources) are not properly internalized. From this point of view there 
came a necessity to introduce social sciences into the solution of the problem. As discussed in 
Steg (2008) policy makers have psychological strategies for achieving this purpose, i.e. 
changing people’s knowledge, perception, motivation, cognitions regarding environmental 
problems. Informational programs for example included promotion of energy conservation, 
among which there are prompts, individualized social marketing, commitment and modeling. 
Except modeling, all these methods were aimed individually for each household without 
involving neighborhood members’ activity or closer circle of people. The thesis in question 
will make a focus on the group behavior and necessary factors needed to take into 
consideration while designing energy conservation campaigns. 
 
It is important to mention that from an economic point of view the comfort and other services 
provided by energy are likely to increase with increasing income, unless relative prices 
changes or preferences changes. While energy is so pervasive in all kinds of economic 
activity, it may be hard to substitute away from increased energy consumption as income and 
hence consumption increase, some substitution possibilities exist. In this thesis I will focus on 
the preferences. How do group processes influence preferences and can such processes help 
enhance lower energy consumption. 
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1.2 Crossing of sciences 
 
The problem of description and modeling of group behavior is studied both within economics 
and other sciences. Individual behavior in classic economics is often explained by models of 
rational and self-interested consumers who try to maximize their own utility. Such an 
individual in the literature is named homo economicus, the model of which consequently was 
revisited by a row of economists. As discussed in Nyborg & Rege (2003), challenges for this 
model is that individuals are not only motivated by economic costs and benefits, but also act 
under the influence of moral or norm-based motivation. In the works of economic 
anthropologists as Marshall Sahlins, Karl Polanyi, Marcel Mauss or Maurice Godelier6
reciprocity
, it was 
shown on logical ground and empirical cross-cultural comparison that choices people make 
regarding production and exchange of goods follow patterns of  which differ from 
possible predictions from "homo economicus" preferences. 
 
A great contribution to economics by introducing the psychological methods was made by 
psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Their classic works were targeted at 
combination of cognitive models of decision making under risk and uncertainty into economic 
models of rational behavioral. Kahneman was consequently awarded with the Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economics in 2002 for the development of the Prospect Theory. These 
works together with others strengthened the Behavioral Economics as a direction in the 
existing field in studying economic decisions of consumers. As discussed in Winett & Ester 
(1983), the behavioral science approach for solving energy conservation problems 
incorporates concepts and strategies from behavioral psychology, social learning theory, 
social and ecological psychology, organizational, environmental and community psychology, 
consumer behavior and economic psychology, behavioral economics, to some extent 
communications, diffusion theory, marketing and sociology. 
 
So far the main emphasis was made to individual choices, which are governed by mental 
constructs like attitudes and values7
                                                 
6 Overview taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homo_economicus 
. Yet not much economics literature exists describing 
purely group choices. When talking about the group behavior, we imply interpersonal 
processes like reciprocity, social norms, approval or disapproval that bring the group as a 
7 Taken from Group Identity, Personal Ethics and Sustainable Development suggesting new direction for social 
marketing research, Johanna Moisander, Society, Behavior and Climate Change Mitigation, p.128, 2000. 
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whole to a specific choice. The complicated social interdependence of individuals makes it 
important to allow psychological and social insights into the discussion. 
 
1.3 Social behavior 
 
I think it is worth to give an overview of how our decision making is affected inside the 
society we live in. There are documented evidences how the social environment has this kind 
of impact. Robert B. Cialdini (2001) vividly describes several social mechanisms specific to 
human communities, one of which is a major social proof phenomenon: we consider our 
action correct depending on how we see others performing this action. In other words, there is 
a tendency to consider an action proper if the majority of people around perform it. Such 
dependence on the others is stimulated by the ambiguous and uncertain situations, where 
individuals cannot make proper decision basing on their own knowledge or experience. 
 
This behavior is called informational cascades in economics and is described as a result of 
rational choice. The illustration for it can be found in Tesser et al. (1983) in a social 
experiment, where individuals were place into groups and asked to evaluate the loudness of 
sounds (stimulus) presented to them. The task was to check the ability of participants to 
properly identify the difference in loudness under the social pressure of others’ opinion. The 
results showed that in a situation of high social pressure the greater the self-doubt reported by 
the subject, the less attention was paid to the actual stimuli. Thereby the greater self-doubt 
increases the conformity to the opinion of others. This type of conformism is closely related 
to the bandwagon effect – a notion used in Microeconomics (regarding consumer demand) 
and Political Science (regarding election process). The bandwagon effect describes the 
situation where individuals follow the behavior of the crowd, i.e. decisions prevailing in the 
surrounding society. Liebenstein (1950) suggested reformulation of static theory of consumer 
demand by relaxing the assumption that consumption behavior of any individual is 
independent of the other’s one. This implies addition of non-functional factors to demand 
formation, having external effect on utility, like bandwagon effect. 
 
In the process of following the majority the working condition is also similarity. The principle 
of social proof is strengthened if the people we observe are considered similar to us. In the 
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paper of social psychologist Leon Festinger8, the proposer of social comparison theory, noted 
that people don't tend to evaluate themselves against others that are too different than 
themselves. This is supported in field experiments (Hornstein, Fisch, Holmes, 1968), in which 
subjects faced a wallet in the street with a return letter to the owner written in normal and 
broken English. According to the result of experiment only 33% of the wallets were returned 
if the writer was considered dissimilar; and 70% in the opposite case. The effect of 
“similarity” was experienced in the study by Atkin9
 
, according to which the opinion of 
students was influenced by exposure to the poll information only if the reference group was 
associated with themselves (e.g. college students). 
Another phenomenon revealing our attitude towards private responsibility in various social 
situations is pluralistic ignorance. The uncertainty and dependence on what others do can 
lead to the failure of the entire groups of bystanders to help a victim requiring help. The 
psychologists provide at least two reasons why with the increasing number of bystanders the 
help provided to the victim decreases10
  
. The first, and most important from the view of 
application to environmental problems, is that with several helpers around, the personal 
responsibility of each bystander is reduced. The basic approach here is that any individual 
expects one of the many others definitely to make an emergency call or help. The social proof 
mechanism can work as the second explanation for it. In case of uncertainty (about the 
seriousness of the victim’s suffering) it is a common action to look around and compare your 
own behavior with others. This bystander effect was examined in Darley & Latane (1968) and 
in the following meta-analysis by Latane & Nida (1981), where it was found that the number 
of help provided is much more frequent if there is one bystander, and much less if there is a 
group of bystanders. In a recent paper of Stalder (2008) this approach was revisited and found 
that in case of restricted communication (case where bystanders were aware of each ones 
presence, but were not able to see each other and communicate) the groups were more helpful 
than individuals. (Latane & Nida, 1981) provides three factors in the inhibiting effect of 
groups: 
                                                 
8 See Festinger (1954) 
9 As mentioned in Mendelsohn and Crespi (1970) Polls, Television and the New Politics. Scranton: Chandler. 
10 As discussed in Robert B. Cialdini (2001) 
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• Audience inhibition (fear of negative evaluation from others). 
• Social influence (conforming to the inaction of others or reinterpreting the situation due 
to the inaction). 
• Diffusion of responsibility (feeling less personal responsibility to act by shifting 
responsibility to other bystanders). 
Latane and Nida pointed that only diffusion of responsibility works for pluralistic ignorance 
phenomenon, yet Stalder (2008) argues that this alone can be a not sufficient explanation, as 
the helping is facilitated in a restricted communication case. A possible explanation suggested 
in the paper is conformity to the helping (i.e. social) norm, which is facilitated by the presence 
of other actors. The importance of social norms was highlighted in Prevos (2006) by the mean 
of a naturalistic experiment in which subject were expected to provide help in a minor 
emergency. The data showed that there is an increase in helping behavior in case of the 
presence of a confederate (in cases with both helping and non-helping ones): 
 
Graph 1. Prevos (2006). Effect of a confederate’s presence on increase of helping behavior. Social pressure at 
work 
These examples provide evidence of the considerable effect of social environment on 
individual decision making. The point is that there can be negative consequences of such 
dependence (like in bystander case), and all these cannot be underestimated in solving 
common environmental problems. 
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1.4 Group identity 
 
Individuals are united in various types of groups (friends, colleagues, neighbors, etc.) not 
stochastically, and a group can be considered as a stable formation. “People tend to move into 
groups of similar opinions and abilities, and they move out of groups that fail to satisfy their 
drive for self-evaluation. Possibly this effect allows society to harbor and sustain groups of 
very different opinions and abilities” (Festinger, 1954). The selection of groups that are 
harder to select and rotate (like neighbors in an apartment) can be anyway in a long-term 
possible, as individuals would like to move one day to a neighborhood more similar to them.  
The group experiences all the social features discussed previously. A bright example of high 
group conformity is a famous Jonestown mass suicide case. The individuals united in a cult 
organization The People’s Temple, originating in San Francisco, secluded themselves in a 
South American rainforest in Guyana, where they were practicing their religious activities 
until the suicide order received by their spiritual leader. A total of 909 died in this massacre 
voluntarily taking cyanide. Cialdini (2001) discusses it as a consequence of the social proof 
phenomenon. In any strong-leader dominated groups there will be fanatically obedient 
individuals who will first take such deathful order as normal and cause consequent 
compliance of other group members. Such a behavior was strengthened by uncertainty 
situation: individuals were placed in a hostile isolated environment far from their homes. Also 
this isolation could strengthen the sense of similarity and unity among them. The idea here is 
that the leadership method in this organization could use a social proof to work for its own 
benefit, as “no leader can hope to persuade, regularly and single-handedly, all the members 
of the group”. It would be more efficient to convince a fraction of the group, and the others 
would be affected by them. This example shows the high potential for implementing the 
group approach in other sciences. 
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2 Typical Games and Models 
 
 
2.1 Social dilemma 
 
Previously it was discussed that human consumption of energy has environmental 
externalities that are not properly internalized, and thus the level of consumption is not 
adjusted by this to be socially optimal. The environment can benefit only in case of common 
action aiming to produce a group good (in particular case energy conservation). The one 
obstacle is that individuals has an incentive to free-ride and benefit more on the actions of 
others. The model below describes this incentive in case where individuals bear some 
environmental damage. 
 
The private utility function can be presented as a benefit caused by the energy consumption E 
subtracted the immediate damage11
𝐵𝐵′(𝐸𝐸) ≥ 0,𝐵𝐵′′ (𝐸𝐸) ≤ 0 Increasing and concave function 
 caused by the sum of amounts of energy consumed in the 
society. In a simple static case taking that the energy consumption is a flow pollutant, we can 
present this in the following way: 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) − 𝐷𝐷��𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
� 
𝐷𝐷′(𝐸𝐸) ≥ 0,𝐷𝐷′′ (𝐸𝐸) ≥ 0 Increasing and convex function 
I would like to discuss the differences between the utility maximizing energy consumption for 
an individual and the social optimal one. First deriving the first order condition we will get 
the utility maximizing solution for an individual: 
𝐵𝐵′(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) = 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖′  
In other words, the marginal benefit should be equal to the marginal damage incurred by an 
individual from his own consumption. 
                                                 
11 This can be costs born due to global warming, which in its place is a consequence of burning the fossil fuels 
and CO2 emissions. The higher is energy consumption, the higher is amount of fossils fuels burnt, etc. 
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To define a social optimum in the simple utilitarian way we need to maximize the sum of 
utilities: 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
 
Then the F.O.C. with respect to the individual consumption level 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  provides the following 
condition for a social outcome: 
𝐵𝐵′(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) = �𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖′
𝑗𝑗
 
This shows that in social optimal case the environmental consequences of individual energy 
consumption are taken with respect to the whole society. Thus marginal benefit in optimal 
case is supposed to be higher than in the previous case implying lower consumption level E. 
This difference can be used as an illustration for the concept of lacking internalization. The 
task is then to make people care of the consequences that their behavior has on others. 
 
Such conflict between private utility maximization and social optimum can be presented as a 
social dilemma, in particular the Tragedy of the Commons. The energy resources in this way 
can be presented as a common, while the energy consumption as an exploitation of it. The 
users explore these resources which are limited, and high consumption of which brings 
negative long-term effects. The classical work of Hardin (1968) describes the situation of 
common failure of the society to achieve long term sustainability in resource usage. Each 
individual maximizes his initial benefit and suffers a delayed cost. On the example of an open 
pasture, every herdsman tries to increase the herd as much as possible as he owns all gains 
from the livestock, yet he experiences only partial cost of overgrazing in a share with other 
herdsmen. The situation is so typical for human behavior, that it was cited in a classic work of 
Aristotle (335-323 BC): "There is a further drawback to common ownership: the greater the 
number of owners, the less the respect for the property. People are much more careful of their 
own possessions than of those communally owned; they exercise care over public property 
only in so far as they are personally affected. Other reasons apart, the thought that someone 
else is looking after it tends to make them careless of it."12
 
 
                                                 
12 Aristotle, Politics, Book II, Chapter 3 
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Going further, we can make a simplifying assumption that there are two individuals who can 
make a dichotomous decision. It is either a high consumption: behavior as usual (to defect), or 
a low consumption: conserving some amount of it (to cooperate). 
 
Attaching some hypothetical values for these cases, we can calculate the pay-off for each 
situation: 
 
𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) = 20, 𝐵𝐵(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ) = 32 
 
𝐷𝐷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) = 10, 𝐷𝐷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ) = 21, 𝐷𝐷(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ + 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ) = 32 
 
Inserting the assumed values into the utility function we get pay-offs in each situation: 
 
• Both cooperate and get: 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) − 𝐷𝐷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) = 20 − 10 = 10 
• One defects, while the cooperator suffers: 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) − 𝐷𝐷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ) = 20 −21 = −1 
• One cooperates, while another defects and enjoys: 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ) − 𝐷𝐷(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ) = 32 − 21 = 11 
• Both defect and get nothing 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ) − 𝐷𝐷(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ + 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ) = 32 − 32 = 0 
Already at this step it can be seen that individuals have an incentive to free-ride on 
conservation of others, and that illustrates the conflict between self and common interest. 
Using these values we can construct a pay-off matrix that coincides with the one in a 
prisoner’s dilemma: 
 
A/B Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 10,10 -1, 11 
Defect 11,-1 0,0 
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2.2 Prisoner’s dilemma 
 
In a basic formulation of it13
 
, the game is presented as a partial conflict of interests between 
two players: A and B. Each of them has two strategies: to Defect or to Cooperate. In relation 
to the common resource, we can say that both players will benefit if both of them cooperate 
(i.e. conserve energy). If both of them do not take care of conservation, they do not benefit 
from the common good and achieve non-cooperative equilibrium. The main feature of this 
game is that there is an incentive to free-ride, to continue exploitation of the resource no 
matter of the strategy of the opponent. The pay-off matrix based on the values has been just 
shown above. 
So the dominant strategy for a player is to defect, which causes the non-Pareto efficient 
outcome and overexploitation of the resource. Two notes about the model’s assumptions 
should be made: firstly, it is a complete information game, i.e. all players are aware of all pay-
offs and available strategies of the other player; secondly, it is a non-cooperative game, as 
players’ communication and any contracts between each other are forbidden. 
 
The better description of the real-world problems is provided in N-person prisoner dilemma 
(NPD). This type of dilemma was suggested to explain various social situations, including the 
by-stander intervention effects. The model of NPD will be presented following Komorita 
(1976) who summarized previous developments in this field. 
 
• Each of the N persons has two choices, cooperative (C) or competitive (D). 
• The outcomes for both choices increase monotonically with the proportion of people 
who make the cooperative choice. 
• The competitive choice always yields a higher outcome than the cooperative choice; 
• The outcome if everyone makes a cooperative choice is greater than the outcome if 
everyone makes a competitive choice. 
 
In the simplified version the pay-off functions can be presented in a linear way. The notations 
Ci and Di will be used to show the outcomes for cooperative and competitive choices, while 
                                                 
13 For example as provided in Varian, H., (1992) Microeconomic Analysis, Norton and Company 
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the subscripts denote number of persons made cooperative decisions. The graphic treatment 
of this game can be presented in the following way14
 
: 
Graph 2. Komorita (1976). Graphic Treatment of N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Here Pc shows the proportion of individuals making a cooperative decision. It is obvious why 
there is no outcome for cooperators if Pc=0 (no cooperators) and no outcome for competitors 
if Pc=1 (no competitors). This graphic treatment satisfies all the game conditions stated above: 
a competitive decision is preferred for any i from 1 to n-1. Yet the absolute cooperative 
outcome is preferred to the competitive one: CN>D0. Presenting outcomes as positive 
functions of proportions of cooperating people we get: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶0,𝑛𝑛 = 1. .𝑁𝑁 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷0, 𝑛𝑛 = 0. .𝑁𝑁 − 1 
 
Where 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁, mc with md are slopes, C0 and D0 are intercepts. 
  
                                                 
14 Adapted from Kelley H.H. and Gryzelak J. (1972) 
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2.3 Incentives to defect 
 
As a possible measurement for the likeliness of cooperation equilibrium Rapoport (1967) 
suggested an index of cooperation for 2-person prisoner’s dilemma, which was updated for 
the n person case by Komorita (1976): 
 
𝐾𝐾 = 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 − 𝐷𝐷0
𝑂𝑂𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑂𝑂𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
= 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 − 𝐷𝐷0
𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛−1 − 𝐶𝐶1 , 0 < 𝐾𝐾 < 1 
 
Where Omax is maximum available outcome, and Omin is correspondingly the minimum one. 
In the case of N-person prisoners dilemma, maximum outcome is achieved by a defector and 
all others being cooperators: Dn-1. The minimum outcome is achieved by one single 
cooperator while others being defectors: C1. This coefficient clearly shows the fraction of 
group interest over the individual interest. Making substitutions of the linear functions into the 
coefficient, we get: 
 
𝐾𝐾 = 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 + 𝐶𝐶0 − 𝐷𝐷0
𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛−1 + 𝐷𝐷0 −𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐1 − 𝐶𝐶0 = 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 − 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑 𝑁𝑁 − 1𝑁𝑁 + 𝐷𝐷0 −𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 1𝑁𝑁 − 𝐶𝐶0= 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑 −
1
𝑁𝑁 (𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑 + 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐) + 𝑑𝑑 
 
Here d is denoted for the difference of intercepts. The larger is the value of d, the greater is 
the motivation to defect. Slope parameters md and mc reflect the increment in payoffs. So 
logically in case of unequal slopes, the greater mc is in comparison to md, the higher is 
incentive to make cooperative decision. 
 
An interesting implication here is view of group size effect. Unrestrictedly increasing the 
number of players we get: 
 lim
𝑁𝑁→∞
𝐾𝐾 = 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 − 𝑑𝑑
𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑 + 𝑑𝑑 
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The coefficient reaches zero if 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 = 𝑑𝑑, or if 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑  is infinite. The cooperative case 1 is 
observed if d is equal to zero (no motivation to defect) and if slopes are equal. In case of equal 
slopes the limit is presented as function of only one parameter d/m: 
 lim
𝑁𝑁→∞
𝐾𝐾 = 1 − 𝑑𝑑/𝑚𝑚1 + 𝑑𝑑/𝑚𝑚 
 
By using numerical examples for the equal slope case, Komorita (1976) shows that K closely 
reaches its asymptote already at N=30 and in this way states that group size has larger effect 
on K in smaller N. It is suggested that cooperation among large number of individuals can be 
more easily coordinated if they could form subsets and act as coalition units. This idea founds 
support in Weil (1966) who used computer simulation for N-person prisoner’s dilemma case 
and concluded that the larger is the number of players, the harder it would be to make 
cooperative decisions. 
 
2.4 Repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
 
The process of human activity in a group can be more realistically illustrated on the multi-
period model of a prisoner’s dilemma. The one-shot scenario implies no future and diminishes 
the main characteristic of human nature: reputation building and reciprocity. In a repeated 
game a player can behave in response to how she was treated in the previous period(s). 
 
Kremps (1982) describes an N times repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with not discounted 
payoffs. At each stage each of the two players recalls his previous actions and is informed 
about those of his opponent. The players move simultaneously at each stage. If we tie it to the 
idea of energy conservation, this seems plausible. The actors in a conservation game can be 
informed about each one’s effort. While players will not actually discuss the actions exactly 
before doing them, and such behavior is also considered as a simultaneous decision making. 
As discussed in this setup, by the method of back induction the repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
has the only unique Nash equilibrium: to defect each period. The final period has the 
defection as obvious strategy, the penultimate stage can not affect the final one, so the 
defection still selected. The fact that actually in experiments players at the beginning provided 
cooperative decisions was explained by the asymmetry of information about the player’s type 
in the frames of rationality. 
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Yet taken that the players are following a tit-for-tat strategy, a reciprocal response is implied 
that brings some positive feeling. In Andreoni et al (1993) this discussion felt under the model 
of Reciprocal Altruism, according to which the player’s utility is  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼,𝛼𝛼 > 0, where 
the parameter is zero if both players played defective. So some pleasure in successful 
cooperation is predicted. The experiment results supported the sequential equilibrium 
prediction. Subjects in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma were significantly more 
cooperative than subjects in a repeated single-shot game. 
 
In case of infinite repetitions we can present the player’s preferences as discounted sum of all 
future payoffs in each separate period. The discounting brings all future payoffs to the present 
value and allows us to calculate which strategy is more attractive to the player15
One possible strategy for the repeated game is grim trigger: the player will cooperate until the 
opponent defects. Afterwards the only defect strategy is implemented, illustrating the very 
unforgivable character of the player. Whether the player would like to defect and deny all 
future benefits from cooperation will depend on this discount factor (taking payoff from the 
previous two person case): 
. Given that 
payoff in each game is denoted as  𝑟𝑟 , and the discount factor is  𝛿𝛿, 0 < 𝛿𝛿 < 1 , the present 
value of the rewards for the player “i” is: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = �𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∞
𝑡𝑡=1  
 
Cooperation:  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 10 + 10 ∙ 𝛿𝛿 + 10 ∙ 𝛿𝛿2 + 10 ∙ 𝛿𝛿3 + ⋯ = 101−𝛿𝛿 
Defection:  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 11 + 0 ∙ 𝛿𝛿 + 0 ∙ 𝛿𝛿2 + 0 ∙ 𝛿𝛿3 + ⋯ = 11 
 
So the player will select cooperation if the discount factor is large enough to consider future 
benefits from cooperation: 
 101 − 𝛿𝛿 > 11 
𝛿𝛿 > 1 − 1011 ≈ 0.09 
                                                 
15 Description presented following lecture notes, University of British Columbia, ISCI 330, 2007 
http://people.cs.ubc.ca/~kevinlb/teaching/isci330%20-%202006-7/Lectures/lect1920.pdf 
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The format of infinite repeated games with discounting was mentioned in Fudenberg & 
Maskin (1986) where it was connected to The Folk Theorem. It asserts that any individually 
rational outcome can arise as a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently 
little discounting. 
 
2.5 Reciprocity 
 
The reciprocity is fundamental part of our psychology and various experiments and 
questionnaire studies show that this notion is realistic and powerful16. The tit-for-tat strategy 
was an example of reciprocal behavior. Thus this kind of behavior may be embedded in our 
preferences, we want to cooperate if and only if others cooperate, and do so even in a one-shot 
game. The reciprocity can be applied to the prisoner’s dilemma case in the one-shot format of 
it (emitting reputation building) and show that with this mechanism individuals can achieve 
fair equilibrium. There are several models of reciprocal preferences that are intended to 
capture this idea. The following is the most cited, but we will return to an alternative later on. 
The utility function in the model is presented in the following way17
 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝑘𝑘�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ) 
: 
 
Where 𝑘𝑘�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  - “i”s belief about “j”s kindness to “i”; 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  - “i”s kindness to “j”; 𝛼𝛼 - weight of 
kindness concerns. Taking the simpler specification with only a multiplicative term (as 
anyway the other’s intentions are not affected by us) the formula becomes: 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝑘𝑘�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  
  
                                                 
16 The overview of the literature supporting this can be found in Falk & Fischbacher (2006) 
17 Information taken from lecture notes, ECON4260, University of Oslo, Karine Nyborg, 2009 
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The kindness function will be defined in the following way: 
 
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 � − 12 (𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 � + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 �) 
 
𝑘𝑘�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖�𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 � − 12 (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 � + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 �) 
 
Where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  is “i” strategy, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  is “i” belief about “j” strategy and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  - is “i” belief about “j” 
guess about “i” strategy. Using the 2-person prisoner’s dilemma pay-off matrix described 
previously, we can calculate values of the kindness function in case of reciprocal cooperation: 
 
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 (𝐶𝐶) = 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 (𝐶𝐶,𝐶𝐶) − 12 �𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝐶𝐶) + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝐶𝐶)� = 10 − 12 (10 − 1) = 5.5 
 
The utility for the reciprocal cooperation case will be then (taking weight of the kindness 
equal to 1): 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 10 + 11 ∙ 114 = 40.25 
 
Considering the defection: 
 
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 (𝐷𝐷,𝐶𝐶) − 12 �𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝐶𝐶) + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝐶𝐶)� = −1 − 12 (10 − 1) = −5.5 
 
𝑘𝑘�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖(𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷) − 12 �𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝐷𝐷) + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (𝐷𝐷)� = 11 − 12 (11 + 0) = 5.5 
 
The utility of player “i” will be then: 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 11 − 11 ∙ 114 = −19.25 
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So the reciprocity working makes cooperation a desired strategy rather than defection, 
removing the incentive to free-ride. As it was mentioned in Falk & Fischbacher (2006), the 
unconditional cooperation in such kind of public good game is practically inexistent. In a 
cited experiment of a public good game, in spite of the fact that predicted the best response 
was to defect irrespectively of what other group members are doing, subjects contributed 
more if the other group members contributed more. The conditional character of such 
cooperation was stated in a classical work of Rabin (1993). On the example of various 
experimental studies, he pointed that the willingness to help seems to be highly contingent on 
behavior of others, and the enthusiasm to sacrifice own benefit is diminished “if people do not 
think that others are doing their fair share”. In the paper of Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 
(2001) Rabin’s principles were extended to a sequential case, and the existence of sequential 
reciprocity equilibrium found its proof. 
 
Returning to the Tragedy of Commons again, the pessimistic approach in it was revisited in 
Ostrom et al. (1999), where it was stated that besides degrading cases, for thousands of years 
people have self-organized to manage common-pool resources, and users often do devise 
long-term, sustainable institutions for governing these resources. The reciprocity and other 
social mechanisms seem to be the possible explanation for this observation. Hardin’s solution 
for socialism or the privatization was called as not the only available, as both government 
ownership and privatization are themselves subject to failure in some instances. 
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3  Effects on cooperation: group 
experiments 
 
 
3.1 Group size 
 
The previous chapter covered the theoretical model how the cooperation can be achieved. The 
social mechanism like reciprocity was found to be effective to shift individuals to social 
equilibrium. The question to be put now is which results does empirical and experimental data 
provide to state conditions encouraging cooperation in a group. I start the discussion below 
with the group size effect. 
 
How the group size can theoretically play role in the Tragedy of Common games was 
mentioned above in Komorita (1976) that cooperation among large number of individuals can 
be more easily coordinated if they could form subsets and act as coalition units. This also 
found its support in Weil (1966). 
 
As shown in experiments by Mark Isaac & Walker (1988), large groups have a more difficult 
time providing public goods than small groups. In the laboratory experiments two factors 
were tested: marginal return to an individual from contribution to a public good and total 
number of participants in the group. The experiments were held with undergraduate students 
in a typical public good game (implying investment decision to the monetary public good), in 
anonymity and absence of communication conditions. The results provided would suggest 
that public goods provision would be closer to efficient in the small group, but only under the 
condition of crowding effect (i.e. condition that the benefit from public good provision for 
each individual is reduced with the larger number of participants: decreasing the marginal 
return of investments). 
 
The observation that group size and cooperation are not in so easy relationship was discussed 
in Bonacich et al. (1976). In computer-administered experiments using various group sizes he 
concluded that the provision to public good could be difficult as a potential cooperative 
consensus in a group can be thwarted by a critical number of non-cooperators. Increasing 
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number of such participants will reduce the probability that others will continue to cooperate, 
and the fact is that in larger groups will be likely more non-cooperators. In addition 
participants can use communication to discuss intentions and influence others to cooperate in 
the sake of common benefit. In larger groups such communication is complicated. 
 
3.2 Partners and strangers 
 
The higher cooperation can also depend on the kind of people cooperating together. The 
intuitive answer is that to achieve long-term cooperative equilibrium the participants should 
consider each other like partners. Following the description of the prisoner’s dilemma, the 
game with absolute strangers will be like multiple repetitions of one shot games, in which 
defection is more likely. Yet the experiments do not provide specific answer to this. Andreoni 
(1988) used two group types in public good experiments: partners (in finitely repeated games) 
and strangers (who played in a repeated single-shot). The result surprisingly showed more 
cooperation among strangers. In the replication of such experiment made by Croson (1996) 
the opposite result was found. In both series of experiments the restart notion was used to 
control learning effects. Restart was made after 10 periods and if no learning effects are 
present, the restart will have no effect. The major results are shown below18
 
: 
Graph 3. Andreoni (1988) results (percent of endowment donated to public good) 
                                                 
18 Taken from Andreoni, J, Croson, R., (2008), from a Handbook of Experimental Economics, Elsevier 
22 
 
 
Graph 4. Croson (1996) results (percent of endowment donated to public good) 
 
As it is seen in the graph, two experiments bring different observations. But in common 
partners show more willingness to restart with higher contributions, what can support the idea 
of reputation building. Other series of experiments held by other authors also give ambiguous 
results. The difference between strangers and partners has compelling explanation in couple 
of papers of Palfrey & Prisbrey (1996, 1997). They tried to estimate a separate effect of 
warm-glow in a experiment with 12 subjects playing four ten-period games as partners (not 
rematching during 10 periods) and strangers (rematching after each period). The individuals 
were assumed to have marginal return on investment in public good equal to V, at the same 
time having privately known cost of giving ri. The warm glow was presented as individual 
parameter Wi. With linear preferences, individuals will make “cut-point” decision to invest 
everything if V-ri+Wi > 0, or to free-ride otherwise. As the authors argue, the partners more 
complied with cut-point rule, while strangers showed more variance and unpredictability. 
 
The main conclusion that can be derived from the above-mentioned is that dealing with 
players that consider each other partners will bring more possibilities for policy makers to 
achieve high contributions to public good. The first is because they are more predictable, and 
providing proper incentives will more likely bring expected results; the second is that partners 
have willingness to improve themselves in the sake of reputation. 
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3.3 Communication 
 
The members in natural groups that are formed on the basis of some common activity or 
interest are expected to have communication among each other. From this point of view the 
case of prisoner’s dilemma with independent decision making cannot be taken as describing 
the real life. Group members are more likely to discuss the common strategy regarding 
donation to public good. This implies some kind of informal agreement made by the 
participants and commitment to keep a promise. The pre-play discussions are often called 
“cheap talk”, as following free-riding is expected due to of absence of formal incentives. In 
contrast the social dilemma experiments provide strong evidence that communication prior to 
decision making increases the cooperation dramatically. Ostrom (2006) provides an overview 
of experiments aimed at testing the communication effect. After introduction of face-to-face 
communication into a baseline study (specifically open discussions in a circle when only 
aggregate investments were known to the participants), in many rounds, subjects did exactly 
as they had promised to one another, only some defections did occur over time. If promises 
were not kept, subjects used this information about the aggregate investment levels to 
castigate the unknown participant who had not kept to their agreement. Interestingly, is that 
especially face-to-face contact has some psychological influence ability on individuals to keep 
their promise, while any other computerized form of discussion reduces the cooperation19
 
. In 
a huge meta-analysis of communication testing experiments from 1958 to 1992 made by Sally 
(1995), it was showed that in 100 rounds prisoner’s dilemma with discussions before each 
round would have 40% more cooperation than the same game without, and 36% more 
cooperation than the game with discussion each 10 trials. 
The attempt to explain communication effect was made by Miettinen & Suetens (2008) by the 
feeling of guilt from deviation of common agreement. The guilt feeling was specifically 
experienced in case of unilateral defection. The communication is expected to increase 
cooperation rates given that subjects learn to avoid guilt-causing choices and that payoff of 
mutual cooperation is higher than in mutual defection. But the feeling of guilt was reduced in 
case some fine was imposed on defection what can point at crowding out the intrinsic 
motivation. The implication for policy is that it would be better to make people do social 
                                                 
19 See Rocco, E., Warglien, M., (1995) 
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accusation of the defector showing how it affects common benefit rather than putting 
monetary fines. 
 
Another interesting moment in Ostrom (2006) overview is an external rules making. 
Necessity of imposing external rules of sanctioning was explained by the fact that group 
member will not spend time and effort on creating their own endogenous rules. But contrary 
to the theoretical expectation, individual show such self-organization in the field. In an 
experiment of Cardenas et al. (2000), where the subject harvesting in the Columbian forest 
were told about external monitoring and probability to be checked and fined in case of exceed 
of optimal harvesting time.  But actually subjects increased their harvesting time, while in 
experiments with face-to-face communication the time was less, and subjects achieved higher 
joint return. It shows that environmental policies can be totally ineffective, even if they were 
designed to achieve some social optimality. This argument meets the idea in the previous 
chapter describing tragedy of the commons, that people for centuries were able to sustainably 
exploit some common pool resource with only self-regulation. The implication here is that 
group could at some extent be allowed to regulate, for example, energy consumption on their 
own. 
 
3.4 Sanctioning and punishment 
 
It is necessary to discuss how the sanctioning system can be introduced into the group. The 
free-riders are expected to exist in public good games, so can only social norms and 
reciprocity affect them? The punishment itself implies a cost, thus it can be considered as 
second-order public good. Fehr & Gächter (2002) tested the altruistic punishment mechanism 
in an experiment with 240 students with two treatment conditions: punishment and not 
punishment. Each member received an endowment of money units and was able to donate to a 
public good up to this endowment. Each treatment was conducted in 6 periods to introduce 
some learning possibility, and the composition of groups changed each period to rule out 
reputation building and reciprocity effects on cooperation. In spite of the fact that a cost was 
imposed on punishment, it did happen frequently by cooperators (above average contributors) 
altruistically punishing defectors (below average contributors). The results of the experiment 
show the unambiguous effect of punishment on cooperation (no matter which treatment is 
applied first): 
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Graph 5 Fehr & Gächter (2002). Time trend of mean cooperation together with the 95% confidence interval. A) 
During the first six periods subjects have opportunity to punish other group members. Afterwards punishment is 
removed. B) During the first periods, punishment of others is ruled out. It is introduced afterwards. 
 
The similar support for sanctioning as an instrument to sustain cooperation is provided in 
Sefton et.al (2006). Comparing reward and punishment mechanisms, the latter was found to 
be more effective in achieving cooperation. In contrast in absence of both reward and 
punishment the contribution path showed decline throughout periods. 
 
If the punishing brings higher contributions, it is straightforward to claim that some 
sanctioning mechanism should be present in any real-life group games. Yet another side of 
this mechanism should be pointed out. First punishing implies some cost which can be 
subtracted from the common contribution to the common pool resource. From this side the 
resource suffers under-provision. From another side, the punishing and monitoring can cause 
undesired crowding out effect of intrinsic motivation. Especially this is related to the external 
regulation, e.g. from the government agency. Nyborg & Rege (2003) provide references to 
empirical findings that governmental provision to public good incompletely crowds out the 
private contributions. The same effect is observed in monetary incentives and fines where 
there may be even more than complete crowding out (violations actually increase). 
26 
 
Frey & Jegen (2000) survey provides prove that crowding out effect is well empirically 
founded and is observed in many different areas of economy and society. The external 
interventions thus crowd-out intrinsic motivation if the individuals perceive them to be 
controlling and if they feel that their motivation is not taken into consideration. 
 
From this point of view any external sanctioning can bring reduction for social norm effect. 
At the same time any monitoring implies as well a cost. The possible suggestion is to avoid 
such type of penetration and letting the group itself handle the violators. As it follows from 
the previous paragraph regarding communication, it can be enough for achieving cooperation 
as it implies some social disapproval for defectors. This disapproval can work as non-
monetary internal sanctioning system that can sustain cooperation. 
 
Ostrom et al. (1992) provides a comparison of common pool resource experiments with 
covenants alone (one-shot and repeated communication opportunities), swords alone 
(repeated opportunity to sanction each other), and covenants combined with swords (one-shot 
communication followed by repeated opportunities to sanction). The communication brought 
substantial improvements for outcomes, while sanctioning alone had shortcoming: subjects 
were willing to bear a cost and place a fine on another one far more than was predicted, i.e. 
overuse of mechanism happened letting the net average net yield actually to fall20. The main 
outcome was that subjects using the opportunity to communicate to make an agreement over 
common investment strategy and choosing their own sanctioning mechanism achieve close-
to-optimal results21
 
. 
The implication from the above mentioned for the policy strategy is to make stress on 
communication factor for the effect of covenants, social approval and the possibility of 
creation of endogenous sanctioning mechanism. 
  
                                                 
20 In case costs and fines are subtracted from the average net yield. 
21 This holds for situations both low and high endowments 
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3.5 A simple model of reciprocity and group norm 
 
Following the examples above, it comes a necessity to formalize the group effect on 
individual decision making. Any model of the personal utility should capture not only the 
utility of the consumption, but also internal preferences for provision and external social 
preferences. The internal motivation for public good donation can be presented by a warm 
glow effect like in the description provided by Andreoni (1990). 
 
The external social effects on utility are characterized by a great variety: as it was shown 
above factors like communication, sanctioning, reputation building and other possible ones 
increase compliance of individuals to some social norm followed by others. The reciprocity 
described in the sub-chapter 2.5 was considered as a social factor able to bring the individuals 
to the cooperative equilibrium in the prisoner’s dilemma game. There the cross-kindness of 
individuals towards each other had an effect on utility, thus the defection of one over the 
cooperating partner imposed a utility loss. Bringing all these ideas together, we can set up 
some morally accepted and practiced action of the group, and the deviation from which will 
cause a decline in utility. This set-up is supposed to catch up the major external effects 
motivating the individual to comply with a group action, including the reciprocity. 
 
In this way the mentioned factors are introduced into the pay-off function of each individual. 
The idea of warm glow or altruism themselves are not depending on the presence of the 
group, yet they alone may not be enough to achieve proper energy conservation. The group 
presence provides additional factors affecting decision making. Taking the decision making as 
process of division budget Y between private good x and public one with amount 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  , 
following Brekke et al. (2010) the pay-off function of an individual “i” at time t (game is 
repeated T times, 0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑇) can be presented in the following way: 
 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼2 (𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)2 
s.t. 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , i.e. the budget constraint. 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌 − 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 ∑ 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1   , assuming 1 < M < n. 
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Recalling the previous reciprocity model in sub-chapter 2.5, we can notice the resemblance 
between the deviation from social ideal (𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) and kindness parameters 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝑘𝑘�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 . The 
cooperating partner’s kindness 𝑘𝑘�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  was positive; while the defector’s 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  was negative, what in 
the product gave negative result. Here the term −(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)2 can catch the same dependence 
in case of many players: the provision lower than the morally accepted in a group (interpreted 
like a feeling of guilt) or higher (interpreted as a feeling of being a “sucker”) brings the 
negative effect on utility. Followed we will show that morally accepted level will depend on 
the average provision in the group, and that has the element of “tit-for-tat” reciprocity, i.e. 
morally accepted level will fall if group in average donates less to the public good. Thus the 
deviation from the morally defined level g� it  has a negative effect on utility, weighted by a 
parameter 𝛼𝛼. The parameter 𝛼𝛼 > 0 is reflecting the strength of social influence from other 
group members. From the point of social norms, the variable 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  shows morally ideal 
contribution and this depends on the perceptions formed in a group. This parameter should be 
expected to be high in smaller groups as for example the individual’s defection can be harder 
to be not considered by others. In this way 𝛼𝛼 can be presented as a function of group size n 
and some constant22
 
α =α���n  
: 
 
The cooperation and common provision can yield benefit in terms of private good to each 
individual, what can be presented by the multiplier M increasing common provision which is 
then distributed equally among each participant. It is noticeable to state that, in the specific 
case of global environmental scope, the energy conservation by itself will not bring 
considerable return to the donors: the benefit that the global society gets from emission 
reductions of is shared by a very large number of people. From this point of view the term Mn  
will equalize to zero. 
 
The parameter 𝛽𝛽 > 0 here shows the increment to utility from unconditional warm grow of 
provision. This addition shows altruistic preferences of each group member which also extend 
outside the group. 
                                                 
22 This is made for the illustration of such dependence. Actually parameter α is expected to depend on more 
variables. 
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While Brekke et al. (2010) considered 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  as a monetary contribution, yet in our case the 
energy conservation is considered, some measures of which can be cheap and others 
expensive. From this point of view it is worth to introduce a cost function 𝑐𝑐(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) of a donation 
to public good. The function is convex and increasing in its argument: 
 
𝑐𝑐′(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) > 0 
𝑐𝑐′′ (𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) > 0 
𝑐𝑐′(0) = 0 
 
Assuming this, the utility function can be rearranged taking into consideration the zero group 
returns from donations, so we get the following (note that 𝑐𝑐(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) replaces 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡): 
 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌 − 𝑐𝑐(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼2 (𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)2 
 
Assuming the specific form of the cost function like 𝑐𝑐(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 12 (𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)2 for each period first 
order condition provides optimal 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 : 
 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) − 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 0 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛼𝛼  
 
Taking into consideration that the donation level to public good cannot be negative or greater 
the budget constraint, for the simplicity reasons we consider only internal solutions. Thus we 
can already say that individual is expected to donate more if the morally accepted level is high 
(social norm working), and if the same is the unconditional warm glow effect. In addition the 
higher is the growth rate of the cost function, the fewer donations are expected. This cost 
factor can be affected by some external policy. In order to reduce these costs a reward system 
seems to be plausible to increase provision. Alternatively some environmental taxation on the 
private good 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡can be adapted, what implies a substitution from private good consumption to 
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the provision to public good (with respect to warm glow effect to the utility). Though these 
measures seem straightforward, they should be apprehended as they can cause considerable 
crowding out effects on intrinsic motivation, as it was discovered in previous paragraph. In 
terms of the model above, that may decrease the strength of parameter𝛼𝛼 and weaken the long-
term purpose of the intervention. 
 
It is noticeable to state that the moral level of donation is more likely to vary for each period 
and depend on the donations of others23
 
𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜆𝜆)?̅?𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , 𝜆𝜆 ∈ [0; 1] 
. This dependence can be shown by the weighted sum 
of the average contribution in the last period and the previous ideal: 
 
Following the thesis approach as I want to discuss the group-based intervention policy, it is 
noticeable to point out the additional effect such policy can bring on the formation of the 
morally accepted norm. The measures like household consultation and informational spread 
are likely to advocate some socially optimal level of donation that can be presented as 𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡 . 
Introducing this factor with a parameter 𝜇𝜇 ( > 0 if the policy has this effect, and 𝜇𝜇 = 0 
otherwise): 
 
𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇)?̅?𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡 ,      𝜆𝜆 + 𝜇𝜇 ∈ [0; 1] 
 
Developing this proposition, we can define the steady state expression for the moral ideal in 
this case and discuss the effect of model parameters on it. 
 
Assuming that the warm-glow parameter is equal among individuals, the average donation 
will then equal to the private one. Inserting the private donation into the formula and setting a 
steady state condition (𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), we get the following expression for the moral ideal: 
𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡  
Solving this expression for 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  through the following calculations we get: 
                                                 
23 In the paper in question evidences from Fischbacher and Gächter (2006), Fischbacher and Fehr (2001) and 
Hauge (2009) are provided to support this proposition. 
31 
 
(1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇)(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝜆𝜆𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡  
The further simplifications lead to the final result: [(1 + 𝛼𝛼) − 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇) − 𝜆𝜆(1 + 𝛼𝛼)]𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡  [(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇]𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡  
𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇  
Transforming the result into a more visual one we get: 
𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇  
𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆𝜆 + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 − (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇  
𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇(1 + 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇 (𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) 
From this expression it is obvious that higher social pressure will cause higher morally 
accepted level if 𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡 > 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 and 𝜇𝜇 < 1 − 𝜆𝜆 
 
From another point of view, the absence of the policy effect, i.e. 𝜇𝜇 = 0, in this expression 
implies the convergence  𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖  . In case the private donation level 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  as well converges to 
the morally accepted level 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 and the impact of parameter 𝛼𝛼 vanishes. 
 
The same result is obtained by finding the first order condition with respect to 𝛼𝛼: 
𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= [(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇]𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡 − [(1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡]𝜇𝜇((1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇)2   
Given as((1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇)2 > 0, the identification of the sign of this expression falls only to the 
numerator: 
 [(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇]𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡 − [(1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + (1 + 𝛼𝛼)𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡]𝜇𝜇 >< 0 
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Dividing by 𝜇𝜇 > 0 and collecting the terms provides the following: 
 
𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡�(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇 − 𝜇𝜇 − 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇� − (1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 >< 0 
𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇) − (1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 >< 0 (𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)(1 − 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜇𝜇) > 0, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡 > 𝛽𝛽 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝜇𝜇 < 1 − 𝜆𝜆 
 
The specified conditions imply that the morally accepted level should be at a specific extent 
dependent on the average donations in the group and the moral ideal from previous period and 
the recommended level should not have a full impact (1 > 𝜆𝜆 + 𝜇𝜇) on the formation of the 
ideal. The norms are not robust and change under the actions of other people. This description 
seems to be plausible from the view of social influence of what others are doing on the 
individual decision making. Recalling the social proof factor this condition is expected to be 
present in real-life situations. 
 
As it was mention before, in case 𝜇𝜇 = 0 the derivative of the steady state moral ideal with 
respect to  𝛼𝛼  is zero meaning the absence of social pressure effect. 
 
This relationship provide reciprocation and social norm character of the game dynamics: ideal 
level of contribution is growing in high social pressure case, what in its turn causes higher 
private contributions. The presence of the policy prompted level 𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡  together with a social 
pressure can move the group to higher provision level. Talking about a possible intervention 
policy theoretically it seems plausible reinforcing internal social mechanisms in groups of 
individuals to increase their compliance.  
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4 Development of Energy 
Conservation Policy 
 
 
4.1 Policy target 
 
As it is expected, the energy consumption will continue to grow, and the capacity of 
alternative energy sources is not yet sufficient to replace other sources. How CO2 emissions 
from burning fossil fuels and climate change in connection can affect socio-economic sphere 
is described in IPCC 2007’s “Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability” report, stating that 
coping with the consequences of natural disasters will impose huge costs on affected areas 
(e.g. from 4 to 6% of GDP in a relatively small country24
 
). 
In this proposal the path of behavioral change is discussed as a measure to tackle 
environmental externalities: policy of energy efficiency and conservation (including other 
environmentally friendly behaviors). The question is how the policy can be designed in order 
to meet conclusions from the previous chapters in order to make individuals active 
participants in environmental initiatives like changing private cars to public transport, buying 
energy efficient home equipments, recycling, energy conservation at home and any other 
activities. 
 
4.2 Working idea 
 
The main objective of the thesis is to investigate an intervention strategy that uses social 
mechanisms in a group to achieve cooperation. It is the time to introduce the main working 
idea of a group approach. This idea has been scattered around a number of works. Personal 
ethics and group identity were suggested as significant motivators of environmentally friendly 
consumer behavior (Granzin and Olsen, 1991; Moisander, 1996; Osterhus, 1997; Sparks and 
Shephard, 1992; Wiener, 1993)25
                                                 
24 Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC, Chapter 7, Industry, settlement and society 
. Social reference and community approach was mentioned 
as one the main factors in behavioral model of energy use in Van Raaij & Verhallen (1983). If 
25 As discussed in Johanna Moisander, “Group Identity, Personal Ethics and Sustainable Development 
Suggesting New Directions For Social Marketing Research”, 2000 
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the communication occurs in social networks of cliques and liaisons (persons connecting 
cliques), it has a more convincing power for a behavioral change (Nan Lin 1973). It means 
that diffusion of environmentally friendly behavior can be stimulated in more integrated and 
communicating groups. 
 
As it was shown before, in groups consumers are expected to have two different goals: 
individual and collective benefit. These two goals actually go into conflict with each other. 
The prisoner’s dilemma often cited as a good example to show the difficulty for achieving 
cooperation among rational and self-interested individuals. In addition the benefits of 
cooperative behavior often are postponed to future that makes the temptation for short-term 
benefits a significant barrier. As discussed previously, such unpleasant scenario can be 
avoided if reciprocity and social norms are present in group game dynamics. Wiener (1993) 
has indentified three obstacles for reaching the cooperative group behavior: 
• Self-interest, a temptation to free-ride or a perception that the social pay-off is too 
small compared with personal sacrifice. 
• Mistrust and suspicion that others not cooperating. 
• A fear of being a “sucker”, a fear that the goal of sustainable development will not be 
made even if a sacrifice is made. 
The obstacles above and their effects can be found in the model description in sub-chapter 
3.5. The fact that social pay-off is too small is reflected in M/n term, that was taken to be 
zero. At the same time the self-interest and temptation to free ride are presented through either 
high cost of public good provision or the low warm-glow parameter 𝛽𝛽. Under this condition it 
is plausible to state that personal sacrifice in terms of private good x is expected to be low. 
The other statements regarding mistrust in others’ cooperation and a fear to be a sucker is 
connected to the dynamics of the model described before. As the morally accepted norm 
depends on the average donation in a group, so if  ?̅?𝐻𝑡𝑡 < 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , the moral ideal will decrease in 
the next period. That in turn causes decay in provision explained by a disappointment in 
others and reciprocal response to it. In the model in sub-chapter 3.5 the provision above the 
morally accepted level also caused the negative effect on utility, and that was associated with 
a feeling of being a “sucker”. 
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From the other point of view the mistrust in others means a low social effect from them on 
personal decision making. Thinking about a possible solution to the problem, a group setting 
can have some features to overcome these obstacles. The approach to unite people to a group 
with common interests and fate helped them to overcome suspicion, skepticism and the 
feeling of insignificance and powerlessness in social dilemma situations (Granzin and Olsen, 
1991; Wiener, 1993). 
 
4.3 Achieving policy effect 
 
The group-based policy supposes some baseline procedures to be implemented first. These 
procedures will have an objective to achieve the policy effect of 𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 > 0. As it was shown 
previously, such condition is crucial for achieving higher morally accepted donation level in 
equilibrium. That in its turn will mean the higher donation for public good from each 
individual. Talking particularly, it can cause better energy conservation in total. At the same 
time in general participants should be able to identify environmentally friendly and not 
friendly behavior, be aware of greener consumer choices, know the common benefit of mutual 
cooperation and other fundamental concepts used previously and be able to compare 
performances of the group members. So the group approach actually embraces the major 
measures in previous energy conservation campaigns, and the measures in question include: 
 
• Energy awareness and consultation 
Among reasons cited for bad energy efficiency followed by households there is mainly low 
awareness of amount of total energy consumed, existence of efficient home appliances and 
externalities of energy waste. Also the way how benefits of efficient energy use are presented 
should be thought: environmental protection and tackling climate change can be valued more 
rather than pure energy saving26
                                                 
26 Taken from A Guide to Policies for Energy Conservation, ISBN 1 85898 635 4, chapter: Information and 
Consultation: the German experience, p. 46. 
. This kind of informational spread is likely to have an 
increase effect on the warm glow parameter  𝛽𝛽. Understanding more or less fully the 
environmental consequences of the behavior and benefits from the conservation individuals 
are expected to get higher marginal utility from a donation. Taking the supposition that the 
individual warm glow can be affected by such advice, two effects will be observed. First 
looking at the equilibrium social accepted level and rearranging it a bit we get: 
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𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇(1 + 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇 (𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) 
𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝜇𝜇(1 + 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇(1 + 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇 𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡  
As the condition set in the model description 𝜇𝜇 < 1 − 𝜆𝜆 means 𝜇𝜇(1+𝛼𝛼)(1−𝜆𝜆)+𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇 < 1, so the increase 
in warm glow will increase the morally accepted donation in equilibrium. It is worth recalling 
that this will happen even in absence of recommendation effect 𝜇𝜇, as in this case the socially 
accepted and individual donations converge to 𝛽𝛽. 
From the other side, the utility maximizing donation 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1+𝛼𝛼  will also be higher with 
larger warm glow parameter. Following the model, consultation and information can have 
considerable effect on provision through the individual warm glow. 
At the same time consultation can work as a promotion of the recommended level 𝐻𝐻� and 
maintain the influence of it on the moral ideal formation (𝜇𝜇 > 0). Without this initial 
measure, further group intervention may not bring a desired effect. In addition, following the 
model, recommended level 𝐻𝐻� is supposed to be higher than 𝛽𝛽 to make the social pressure 
factor working on increase of the morally accepted donation. Taking the fact that the warm 
glow parameter can increase from the consultation services, so should do the advised 
donation. It seems logical to ask more conservation from the more pro-environmental 
individuals. Some pro-environmental actions can bring also cost savings, especially talking 
about energy conservation. From this point of view the cost function of a provision  𝑐𝑐(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) 
may be affected and get reduced values. 
• Creating modeling and benchmark system 
The feedbacks of energy usage to end-consumers were among typical measures in various 
campaigns (home IT, energy calculators, leaflets etc.). Here the comparative feedbacks are 
taken into consideration, i.e. each participant of the neighborhood receiving information about 
others’ consumption. This information can be added to a typical monthly energy bill or come 
online. The presence of the reciprocity mechanism and compliance with a social norm implies 
that participants should analyze others’ behavior and react on it. Thus such system is 
fundamental to make the morally accepted norm depend on the average donation in a group 
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(as in the model). Reinforcing the reciprocity mechanism with benchmarking will mean 
higher social pressure parameter 𝛼𝛼 . Taking that the conditions formulated in the model of 
sub-chapter 3.5 are met (particularly that the moral level is not robust and changing under the 
actions of others) the higher parameter 𝛼𝛼 will cause higher morally accepted level of donation. 
It is interesting to note, that possibly this condition will be satisfied as soon as this benchmark 
system is introduced, given that the individuals could have no opportunity to compare their 
energy conservation efforts before. Returning to the recommended level 𝐻𝐻� a local 
environmental agency can prompt conservation attempts, so that the participants could have 
target for improvement.  
• Social Networks 
The neighborhood approach is very straightforward. Taking into consideration how fast the 
social networks27
  
 grow and how integrated people become through internet, various pro-
environmental ideas can be easily spread there. The same group approach, but now your 
group can include more people that can affect your opinion. The neighborhood and workplace 
responsibility area sometimes can drop friends that are similar to you in socio-demographic 
sides and influence your opinion. Also digital feedback through internet should be more 
advanced. The computerization is moving on, and such a common online database where 
everyone has his own profile may be common in future. Yet this cannot be taken as major 
development area because, as it was stated previously, face-to-face live communication has 
advantage over the computerized one. 
                                                 
27 Like Facebook, MySpace, blogging systems 
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4.4 Group formation 
 
If the previous paragraph was discussing the baseline policy measures aiming and bringing 
the effect  𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 > 0 or affecting the personal warm glow, this part will discuss more the ways 
to increase the social norm factor 𝛼𝛼 and additional details following the policy discussion. 
 
4.4.1 Participants 
 
The question is whether a group targeting policy will have advantages over other types of 
interventions. Generally speaking the group approach aiming at changing the behavior would 
better cover the sphere where social interactions of people are easily observable and exposed, 
i.e. a limited number of people interacting with each other in a bounded area and consuming 
energy as a group. The purpose of this setting is to achieve a high social pressure 𝛼𝛼 that was 
defined as necessary for higher contributions to a public good. In this way close residential 
areas and work places are perfect candidates for the policy target. This notion will be called 
neighborhood in a wider meaning of the word. 
 
In situation when the individual has no experience in energy conservation, or has the 
information but is unsure about how much convenience he must sacrifice in trade-off to be 
environmentally friendly, he will “scan” the environment and look to others. As it was seen in 
the previous chapters, other participants should have a considerable influence on the decision 
making that can be achieved if the group members know each other face-to-face, and are in 
long-term a collaboration. In the model discussed previously that will be represented in higher 
𝛼𝛼 parameter of social pressure. The policy idea is not to forcefully attach people to some 
group, but rather use the existing ones. Participants in natural groups will likely not be 
strangers but rather at least acquaintances, and thus their collaboration should be more 
predicted and include reputation building. The observation that social proof phenomenon is 
more effective within homogeneous group also supports the idea that self matched 
neighborhood members will possess many similarities. The neighborhood concept embraces 
these conditions: people self organized in a group are at some extend homogeneous, long-
term partners, knowing each other face-to-face. So the morally accepted ideal is expected to 
be more dependent on the average group provision, what meets the model description in sub-
chapter 3.5. 
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4.4.2 Group size 
 
As it was shown in group experiments, such an influence circle should not be large, as the 
individual should know his weight inside a group and know that his behavior is observed and 
cannot be missed. Also many factors having implication to the policy making will be 
facilitated in smaller groups: 
 
• Communication and bargaining will be easier. 
• The benchmarking and comparison of energy consumption will be more obvious. 
• The social norms and reciprocity mechanism will be stronger as each individual is 
easier observed by other members. 
 
All these improvements increase the compliance of the individuals to some morally ideal 
norm. The expectation that any deviation from the covenant made at the group meetings will 
be easily observed and meet a social disapproval (in addition possible endogenous sanction if 
the group members created one) will have an effect in higher 𝛼𝛼 in the group game model, 
which in its turn encourages higher public good provision. 
 
4.4.3 Team building 
 
The possible consequence of the group based approach is that using all social mechanisms in 
groups will create strong teams, not only groups in narrow meaning. The initial acquaintance 
of group members will of course create good fundament for this, but “the team” is a higher 
degree of simple collaboration regarding energy conservation. The presence of a group 
identity, common purpose and social support from other team members can have an effect 
increasing the unconditional warm glow parameter  𝛽𝛽. A lot of ideas can be taken from 
business studies regarding creating an “ideal team” at work place. In order to bring inspiration 
and common feeling of a team, the possible measures are present: 
 
• Creating team concept (special name, logo). These measures should create self-
determination of participants like one unit with one common task. They should 
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identify themselves as a united group with some strong group identity. How strong the 
devotion to common idea is (in our case environmental protection) was illustrated in 
the introduction. From this point of view such team identity and support can bring 
additional increment to utility, which is though not specifically covered in the model. 
 
• Holding regular gatherings. These meetings should facilitate mutual trust, support and 
communication. As a matter of fact, daily activities of each member can create 
obstacles to live communication. As it was shown above, face-to-face discussions 
have a crucial role in increasing cooperation and are to be reinforced by the policy. 
The covenants that could be agreed and social disapproval that could be exercised 
during these meetings are closely connected to the strength of social pressure factor  𝛼𝛼. 
 
• Making energy conservation entertaining and not routine. For example, there can be 
contest among various groups with prizes, some yearly festival of the best teams, 
giving prestigious signs to best conservators. 
 
4.4.4 Con-environmental groups 
 
All individuals vary by preferences and life style, and it is probable that some group of pure 
con-environmental individuals can be formed. The question is whether they can be affected 
enough by the described group-based intervention by creating neighborhood responsibility 
setup (i.e. smaller groups residing together, having comparative feedback and face-to-face 
meetings.). What kind of social disapproval can be present in such group if all participants are 
initially con-environmental? And can measures like informational spread and consultation 
influence them? Such groups will be identified by the policy makers after some time (thanks 
to some benchmark mechanism), so they can be treated in a specific way. If information has 
no effect, possible solution is that this con-environmental group can be split, and each part 
attached to closest neighborhood that can be more environmentally friendly and will create 
higher social pressure on the attached. As group size is designed not to be large, some close 
geographical area can consist of several groups that are still similar and connected, so the 
rotation will not radically change the format of intervention. Another possibility is to 
aggregate groups on a higher level, for example further implementation can include clustering 
41 
 
the groups and building reciprocity mechanism on a larger scale. Yet this measure requires 
larger discussions regarding how a group behaves differently from an individual in public 
good games, and that falls out of the thesis focus. 
 
4.5 Utility concerns 
 
Shifting from the private good consumption to the donation to private good supposed from a 
group setting will have consequences for the utility. As we remember, the consultation and 
benchmarking system are supposed to introduce some advocated donation level 𝐻𝐻� that is 
supposed to be higher than the marginal warm glow benefit to the utility. This advocated level 
should be in effect (𝜇𝜇 > 0) for the formation of a group moral ideal, but should not be 
increased unlimitedly by purpose: policy advice should not dominate in the formation of 
moral ideal (𝜇𝜇 < 1 − 𝜆𝜆) as it can cause considerable crowding out and meaningless of social 
factors in decision making. 
Once these conditions are done, the proper group setting can increase social control factor 
𝛼𝛼 and bring higher moral ideals and donations. It is interesting to track the change in utility 
happing due to higher social pressure. Recall the utility function from the sub-chapter 3.5: 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌 − 𝑐𝑐(𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝛼𝛼2 (𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)2 
With the utility maximizing donation level was: 
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛼𝛼  
Inserting it to the utility function, taking the specific form of the cost function used in the 
model and taking the moral ideal not explicitly depending on the social pressure parameter, 
we get the following: 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌 − 12�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛼𝛼 �2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛼𝛼 ) − 𝛼𝛼2 �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛼𝛼 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�2 
Finding the derivative with respect to 𝛼𝛼: 
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𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= −�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛼𝛼 �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(1 + 𝛼𝛼)(1 + 𝛼𝛼)2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(1 + 𝛼𝛼)(1 + 𝛼𝛼)2
−
12�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛼𝛼 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�2 − 𝛼𝛼 �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛼𝛼 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(1 + 𝛼𝛼)(1 + 𝛼𝛼)2  
 
Making simplifications and collecting terms provides with the following result: 
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= − (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)(1 + 𝛼𝛼)3 + (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝛼𝛼) − 12 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)(1 + 𝛼𝛼) − 𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡))(1 + 𝛼𝛼)3= − 12 (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)2(1 + 𝛼𝛼)(1 + 𝛼𝛼)3 ≤ 0  
From this point of view the utility of the individuals will diminish with stronger social 
control. The private “sacrifice” mentioned previously can be interpreted here in the reduced 
utility. The group setting stimulates higher public good provision via the social pressure, but 
at the same time makes any small deviation from the morally accepted level a considerable 
loss to utility. Also the higher donations are expensive, and that is observed in convex cost 
function used in the example. So the main implication here that the policy is not supposed to 
reinforce the social control maximally, rather there should be some optimal setting. This 
negative consequence can be smoothed if the cost function is relaxed (for example energy 
conservation requires some effort to be spent, but also makes a monthly energy bill smaller. 
Also compensation for recycled bottles seems to be a plausible example) or additional non-
material factors increasing utility (besides warm glow, like team feeling or group support). 
Yet more research needed to estimate how the individual can be compensated and by which 
means to avoid crowding out effects. 
 
4.6 EcoTeam Program Example 
 
Taking the wide variance of different energy conservation campaigns, we must take out the 
one using a group or team setup to cite a proper example. The Staats et al. (2004) provide 
description of previous intervention policies and show the main shortcoming of them: 
inability to sustain the environmentally friendly behavior. As a counter example a more 
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advanced policy is The EcoTeam program (ETP) - a project of Global Action Plan28
 
 
organization (hereinafter: GAP), targeting many of the behaviors (approximately 100), with 
20,000 households participated worldwide. The more description following Staats of this 
program implemented in Netherlands is provided below: 
4.6.1 Treatment29
 
 
Team building. A combination of all previous methods like information spread, feedback, 
and social support was put into practice. The main method in this program was a group 
setting: EcoTeams are groups of 6 to 10 people who usually know each other already as 
neighbours, friends, club members, etc. EcoTeams met once a month. During these meetings, 
personal experiences, ideas, and achievements related to environmental household behaviour 
were shared. This setting exactly follows the discussions provided earlier regarding the group 
size, neighbourhood grouping and communication effect. 
 
Information. EcoTeam members were provided with a personal EcoTeam Workbook which 
included a short introduction to garbage, gas, electricity, water, transport and consumption 
themes, and an explanation of the goals GAP pursues. This introduction was followed by a 
listing of a large number of pro-environmental actions that can be undertaken in the 
household. Each team is also provided with a logbook in which the actions taken by each 
participant are recorded. 
The feedback system. In each EcoTeam the quantitative group-data (used amount of natural 
gas, electricity, etc.) was recorded and sent to a central database at the national GAP office in 
The Hague, The Netherlands each month. This quantitative information was compared with 
the situation before participation. The result of this comparison is returned to the team by 
means of a so-called team report. The Dutch EcoTeams also received feedback about the 
accumulated results of all EcoTeams in the Netherlands and in other countries by means of 
the 'EcoTeam-Newsletter'. This feedback system aims to weaken people's opinion that their 
effort is negligible. 
 
 
                                                 
28 http://www.globalactionplan.com 
29 Taken from the summary version of the paper by Henk Staats, Paul Harland: Effectiveness of The EcoTeam 
Program in the Netherlands: A Long Term View 
www.globalactionplan.nl/.../samenvatting_onderzoek_rul_naar_effectiviteit_ ecoteam_programma.doc 
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4.6.2 Data collection design 
 
EcoTeam members. 
A group of 445 people who were ready to start the ETP in January or February 1994 received 
a request to participate in the research. Of this group, 289 (65%) cooperated prior to 
participation in the ETP by completing the first set of mail questionnaires (T0). Yet it is not 
clearly stated how was the sample procedure to recruit the mentioned group of people. In 
October 1994, 205 participants (71%) completed the post-ETP questionnaires (T1). In 
December 1996, this group was approached again with the request to complete a third set of 
mail questionnaires in order to obtain a similar set of data 2 years after participation (T2). 
The sample of respondents who completed both T1 and T2 was reduced to 150, meaning 
around 48% drop out until the final stage. This sample of ETP participants had an average age 
of 52 years, a higher income and higher education level than the average Dutch population, 
and consisted of 85% women. 
 
Comparison group 
The comparison group was also surveyed at the same longitudinal basis regarding only eight 
specific behaviors among the annual panel of 1500 respondents of Dutch population. In order 
to equalize the initial performance (in terms of M and SD) at T0 over a Pro-environmental 
Behavior Index (PBI)30
 
 of the EcoTeams and control group a subsample of 332 was taken 
from the panel, which was studied also in following periods T1 and T2. No drop out was 
reported in the survey description. 
The main body of the questionnaires administered to EcoTeam participants at T0, T1, and T2 
was identical. At each phase, the survey contained questions about the performance of a series 
of 38 specific environmental household behaviors, measures of intention, perceived 
behavioral control, and habit strength for one of these behaviors, and registration forms for 
the weight of solid waste disposed of and the amount of gas, electricity, and water consumed 
during a 2-week period.  
                                                 
30 PBI is created from the set of eight pro-environmental behaviors: separation of organic waste from solid waste,  having 
dirty laundry until the washing machine can be fully loaded, leaving the faucet running while doing the dishes, bringing a 
shopping bag from home when going shopping, using unbleached coffee filter bags, using  detergents in refill packaging, 
using unbleached toilet paper, and refusing plastic bags or wrappings offered by shopkeepers. Scores on these 8 items, all on 
7-point Liker-type scales ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (always) were averaged. 
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4.6.3 Results 
 
The survey observations show considerable and significant improvement of the 
environmentalism in household behavior. The tables showing changes regarding the estimated 
behaviors can be found in the appendix to the thesis. The performance improvement in 
general had also a long-term effect. As regards the energy consumption, respondents 
consumed in later period T2 in comparison to T0 7,6% less electricity and 16,9% less gas. 
 
Graph 6 Staats et al (2004). Mean scores of ETP Participants and Nonparticipants on the Pro-environmental 
behavior Index (PBI) Across the Phases of the Study 
 
The similar results under the scope of EcoTeam Program are reported in the USA, reporting 
41-51% less garbage sent into the waste stream, 25-34% less water used, 17% less energy 
used, 16-20% less fuel used for transportation31. The EcoTeams site covering activity in UK 
informs about reduction of rubbish by 20%, more recycling and improvement in energy and 
water management, cut of CO2 emission by 17% among participants32
 
. 
                                                 
31 Empowerment Institute 2002 Community-Based Social Marketing as a Planning Tool, with reference to 
Global Action International, www.empowermentinstitute.net/files/Chapter5.pdf 
32 http://ecoteams.org.uk/ 
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Such change in behavior is consistent with the group dynamics discussed. Yet there are 
alternative interpretations necessary to point out. There is still possibility that these PBI 
improvements were caused rather by selfish preferences (i.e. if some cost saving was realized 
from environmental change) though it was not directly stated whether the economic savings 
from environmental behavior were discussed during the group meetings. Staats et al. (2004) 
checked the functioning of EcoTeam on an example of travel mode behavior and tried to 
show intentions together with habit formation as a predictor of a change. The specific 
behavioral intention expressed before participation was identified to predict that respondents 
would change from cars to more environmentally friendly means of transport for short 
distances. In addition the ones “who reported strong social influence from their EcoTeam 
members, social interaction with EcoTeam members appeared to have resulted in intentions 
predictive of pro-environmental behavior change, irrespective of the degree to which habits 
were consolidated.” Though detailed study only of one behavior does not allow considering 
social factor and intentions as reason for the change. 
 
At the same time the considerable drop-out should be mentioned. The data can be biased due 
to the absence of information about respondents who split off. It can be the case that the ones 
who dropped the program did it due to their unwillingness to keep on behaving 
environmentally and poor performance. Plus the initially recruited participants ready to 
participate in the survey can be considered as already pro-environmentally intended. Thus 
intervention policy could be a success due to high warm glow of donation present in the 
sample. And the comparison group from this point of view might not be initially so pro-
environmental. 
 
Though the EcoTeam program illustrates the implementation of the group approach in action, 
there are still areas requiring more research. There should be more evidences about the effect 
of social mechanisms in a group on the behavioral improvement, and the influence of group 
setting on the individual preferences. The results at least do not go opposite the idea that the 
combination of the methods used in previous campaigns, predictions from various 
experiments and group setting can be used in achieving environmental goals. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
 
The results from a number of behavioral experiments aimed to test the cooperation conditions 
in a group provide a good insight for policy makers. Preferences of an individual are affected 
by various social factors like norms and reciprocity. The classical prisoner’s dilemma cited as 
an example of common pool resource exploitation problem provides game theory’s prediction 
about “the defection” as the best strategy. Yet it was observed that people did cooperate, both 
historically in terms of using some common resource, and experimentally in groups. Applying 
the experimental setting aimed at increasing the social norms effect (i.e. using smaller groups, 
encouraging communication, provision of feedback) can theoretically increase the 
cooperation rates inside a group. 
 
Gathering the previous achievements in experimental and behavior economics with 
application of insights from social sciences provides an idea for policy makers about the 
group approach to promote environmentally friendly behavior among the population. Using 
neighborhood selection of people residing or working close to each other, in this way taken as 
partners in a repeated game, providing them with feedback and benchmark information, 
arranging regular meetings (taken as pre-decision communication and covenants, plus 
opportunity to punish defectors via social disapproval) were stated to have a large potential to 
help individual improve environmentally friendly performance and to sustain it in a long term. 
EcoTeam program provided an illustration of how this approach can be implemented in a 
real-life. 
 
Talking about the policy instrument it is necessary to compare its costs and benefits. The 
benefits that can be acquired for the society in general are lower resource requirements for the 
energy production and less CO2 emissions. Worth noticing, that the return from the energy 
conservation in terms of global climate consequences of it are not felt by individuals and 
enjoyed in terms of the utility, and internalization of it can compensate lower energy 
consumption. The costs of the discussed policy will include initial consultation, creation of 
the benchmarking system with the group setting. The main trait of such policy though is that 
the individuals in groups are expected to handle their behavior on their own without strict 
external intervention. So the follow-up costs will include only monitoring of the energy 
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consumption and other environmental indexes and maintaining the system. As it was shown 
the utility sacrifice of individual for higher public good provision can be compensated both 
directly (as it is done nowadays regarding recycling of the packaging) and via social factors 
affecting utility (like groups competition, team feeling, prizes for best conservators). In other 
words the cost of an individual to be involved into such policy can be presented as a 
compensation for his loss in the utility. 
 
Repeating again, such intervention policy should in first place provide supportive help to the 
neighborhood avoiding external rules settings, sanctioning or strict standards. The social 
norms principle will work in case of strong intrinsic motivation and the groups could be 
provided with freedom to set their own rules. This idea requires much deeper discussion about 
the role of government in the population’s decision making. Any attempt to amend the 
preferences on a larger scale can be considered as intervention to private life and personal 
freedom. In spite of these nuances to be considered by the policy makers, the group approach 
can help to avoid one of the main shortcomings of intervention policies in past decades: a 
very limited duration of pro-environmental change. Yet additional field research is required to 
estimate specifically how group setting affects the personal decision making regarding energy 
conservation and other environmental behaviors, and how strong the social pressure, policy 
advice and compensations should be to avoid the crowding-out effect. 
49 
 
6 Literature list 
 
 
Andreoni, J, Croson, R., (2008). Partners versus strangers: random rematching in public 
goods experiments. Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier. 
 
Andreoni, J., (1988). Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. 
Journal of Public Economics 37, 291–304. 
 
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-
glow giving. The Economic Journal 100: 464–477. 
 
Andreoni, J., Miller, J. H., (1993). Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated 
Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence. The Economic Journal, Vol. 103, No. 418, 
570-585. 
 
Aristotle, Politics, Book II, Chapter 3. 
 
Azfar O., (1999). Rationalizing hyperbolic discounting, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 38/2, 245-252. 
 
Benzion, U., Rapaport, A., Yagil, J., (1989). Discount rates inferred from decisions: an 
experimental study. Management Science, 270–284. 
 
Bonacich, P., Shure, G. H., Kahan, J. P., Meeker, R. J., (1976). Cooperation and Group 
Size in the N-Person Prisoners' Dilemma. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 20, 
No. 4, 687-706. 
 
Brekke, K. A., Hauge, K. E., Lind J. T., Nyborg K., (2010). Playing with the Good Guys, 
A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation, Department of Economics, 
University of Oslo. http://folk.uio.no/karineny/files/goodguys.pdf 
 
50 
 
Cardenas, J.-C., Stranlund, J.K., Willis, C.E., (2000). Local environmental control and 
institutional crowding-out. World Development 28, 1719–1733. 
 
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Chapter 7, Industry, settlement 
and society. 
 
Croson, Rachel T. A., (1996). Partners and strangers revisited. Economics Letters 53, 25–
32. 
 
Darley, J.M., Latane, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of   
responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8(4), 377-383. 
 
Dufwenberg, M., Kirchsteiger, G., (2001). A theory of sequential reciprocity. Discussion 
paper. University of Vienna. 
 
Empowerment Institute (2002). Community-Based Social Marketing as a Planning Tool, 
with reference to Global Action International. 
www.empowermentinstitute.net/files/Chapter5.pdf 
 
Environment Takes Back Seat To Comfort, Convenience. Article dated June 23, 2009. 
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2009/06/23/environment-takes-back-seat-to-
comfort-convenience/ 
 
European Environmental Agency, Household Energy Consumption. 
 
http://ims.eionet.europa.eu/Sectors_and_activities/households/indicators/energy 
Falk, A., Fischbacher, U., (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic 
Behavior 54, 293–315. 
 
Fehr, E., Gӓchter, S., (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature Vol 415. 
 
51 
 
Festinger, L., (1954). A Theory of Social Comparison Processes. Human Relations, 114-
140. 
 
 
Fischbacher, Urs and Simon Gächter, (2006). Heterogeneous social preferences and the 
dynamics of free riding in public goods. IZA Discussion Papers 2011. 
 
Fischbacher, Urs, Simon Gächter, and Ernst Fehr, (2001). Are people conditionally 
cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters 71:397-404. 
 
Frey, B. S., Jegen, R., (2000). Motivation crowding theory: A survey of empirical 
evidence. CESifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich, Working paper # 245. 
 
Fudenberg, D., Maskin, E., (1986). The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With 
Discounting Or With Incomplete Information. Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 3, 533-554. 
 
Granzin, K. L., Olsen, J. E., (1991). Characterizing Participants in Activities Protecting 
the Environment: A Focus on Donating, Recycling and Conservation Behaviors, Journal 
of Public Policy and Marketing, 10(2) (Fall), 1-27. 
 
Guide to Policies for Energy Conservation, ISBN 1 85898 635 4, chapter: Information 
and Consultation: the German experience, p. 46. 
 
Hamrin, J., (1979). Energy-saving homes: don't bet on technology alone. Psychology 
Today 12, 18. 
 
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248. 
 
Hauge, Karen Evelyn, (2009). Eliciting moral ideals in a public good game experiment. 
In Morality and economic decisions: An experimental approach. PhD dissertation 
submittet to the University of Oslo. 
 
52 
 
Hille, John, (1995). Sustainable Norway: probing the limits and equity of environmental 
space. The Norwegian Forum for Environment and Development (ForUM), 431. 
 
Hornstein, H., Fisch E., Holmes M., (1968). Influence of a Model's Feelings about his 
Behavior and his Relevance as a Comparison Other on Observers' Helping Behavior. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10: 220-6. 
 
IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Contribution of 
Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report, Chapter 7, Industry, settlement and 
society. 
 
Jochem, E.,  Sathaye, J.,  and Bouille D., (2000). Society, Behavior, and Climate Change 
Mitigation, 109-126, Kluwer, Dordrecht, ISBN 0-7923-6802-9. 
 
Kelley, H.H. and J. Gryzelak, (1972). Conflict between individual and common interest 
in an N-person relationship, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21, 190–197. 
 
Komorita, S.S., (1976). A Model of the N-Person Dilemma-Type Game. Journal Of 
Experimental Social Psychology 12, 357-373. 
 
Kreps, David M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. And Wilson, R., (1982).  Rational Cooperation 
in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. Journal Of Economic Theory 27, 245-252. 
 
Laibson, D, (1997). Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 112, No. 2, In Memory of Amos Tversky (1937-1996), 443-477. 
 
Latane’, B and Nida, S (1981). Ten years of research on group size and helping. 
Psychological Bulletin Vol 89, No 2, 308-324. 
 
Liebenstein, H., (1950). Bandwagon, snobs, and Veblen effects for the theory of 
consumers' demand. Quarterly Journal of Economics 64, 183–207. 
 
53 
 
Loewenstein, G., Elster, J., (1992). Choice Over Time. Russell Sage Publications, ISBN 
0871545586. 
 
Mark Isaac, R., Walker, James M., (1988). Size effects in public good provision: the 
voluntary contributions mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 103, No. 
1, 179-199. 
 
Mendelsohn and Crespi (1970). Polls, Television and the New Politics. Scranton: 
Chandler. 
 
Miettinen, T., Suetens, S., (2008).  Communication And Guilt In A Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Discussion paper No. 2008–12, Tilburg University, ISSN 0924-7815. 
 
Moisander, J., (1996). Attitudes and Ecologically Responsible Consumption. Moral 
responsibility and concern as attitudinal incentives for ecologically oriented consumer 
behavior. Research Reports 218/1996. Statistics Finland, Helsinki. 
 
Moisander J., (2000). Group Identity, Personal Ethics and Sustainable Development 
suggesting new direction for social marketing research, Society, Behavior and Climate 
Change Mitigation, p.128. 
 
Nan Lin, (1973). The study of human communication. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 
 
Nyborg, K., lecture notes, (2009), Reciprocity, ECON4260, University of Oslo. 
 
Nyborg, K., Rege, M., (2003). Does public policy crowd out private contributions to 
public goods?. Public Choice 115, 397–418. 
 
Osterhus, T., (1997). Pro-social Consumer Influence Strategies: When and How do they 
Work? Journal of Marketing, 61, 16-29. 
 
Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C., Norgaard, R., Policansky, D. (1999).   Revisiting the 
Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, Science, Vol. 284. no. 5412, 278 – 282. 
54 
 
 
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., Gardner, R., (1992). Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-
Governance is Possible, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, 404-
417. 
 
Ostrom, E., (2006). The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of 
institutions and common-pool resources. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
Vol. 61, 149–163. 
 
Palfrey, Thomas R., Prisbrey, Jeffrey E. (1996). Altruism, reputation, and noise in linear 
public goods experiments, Journal of Public Economics 61, 409–427. 
 
Palfrey, Thomas R., Prisbrey, Jeffrey E. (1997). Anomalous behavior in public goods 
experiments: How much and why? American Economic Review 87, 829–846. 
 
Perman, R., Ma Y., McGilvray, J., Common, M., (2003). Natural Resource and 
Environmental Economics, Pearson Education. 
 
Prevos Peter, (2006). Explanation Models for the Bystander Effect in Helping Behavior. 
Psychology 1B course (PSY12) article at Monash University. 
 
Rabin, M., (1993). Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, American 
Economic Review 83, 1281-1302. 
 
Rapoport, Anatol, (1967). A note on the “index of cooperation” for Prisoner's Dilemma. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 11, 101–103. 
 
Robert B. Cialdini, (2001). Influence: Science and practice, fourth edition, Allyn and 
Bacon. 
 
Rocco, E., Warglien, M., (1995). Computer Mediated Communication and the 
Emergence of Electronic opportunism. Department of Economics, Laboratory of 
Experimental Economics, University of Venice, Italy. 
55 
 
 
Sally David, (1995). Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, A Meta-
Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, Rationality and Society, Vol. 7, No. 1, 58-
92. 
 
Sefton, M., Shupp, R., Walker, J., (2006). Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision 
of Public Goods. Indiana University CAEPR Working Paper #2006-005. 
 
Socolow, Robert H. (1978). Saving energy in the home: Princeton's experiments at Twin 
Rivers. Ballinger Pub. Co. (Cambridge, Mass.), ISBN 0884100804. 
 
Sparks, P. and Shephard R., (1992). Self-Identity and the Theory of Planned Behavior: 
Assessing the Role of Identification with Green consumerism. Social Psychology 
Quarterly, 55, 388-399. 
 
Staats Henk, Harland, Paul: Effectiveness of The EcoTeam Program in the Netherlands: 
A Long Term View. 
http://www.globalactionplan.nl/upload/docs/samenvatting_onderzoek_rul_naar_effectivit
eit_ecoteam_programma.doc 
 
Staats, H., Harland, P.,  Wilke, Henk A. M., (2004). Effecting Durable Change: A Team 
Approach to Improve Environmental Behavior in the Household. Environment and 
Behavior, Vol. 36, No. 3, 341-367. 
 
Stalder, D. R. (2008). Revisiting the issue of safety in numbers: The likelihood of 
receiving help from a group. Social Influence, 3, 24-33. 
 
Steg Linda, (2008). Promoting household energy conservation. Energy Policy 36, 4449-
4453. 
 
Tesser, A., Campbell, J., & Mickler, S. (1983). The role of social pressure, attention to 
the stimulus, and self-doubt in conformity. European Journal of Social Psychology, 13, 
217–234. 
56 
 
 
Thaler, R., (1981). Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Economics 
Letters, 201–207. 
 
University of British Columbia, Lecture notes, ISCI 330, 2007. 
http://people.cs.ubc.ca/~kevinlb/teaching/isci330%20-%202006-7/Lectures/lect1920.pdf 
 
Van Raaij Fred W. and Theo M. M. Verhallen, (1983).  A behavioral model of residential 
energy use. Journal of Economic Psychology 3, 39-63, North-Holland. 
 
Varian, H., (1992). Microeconomic Analysis, Norton and Company. 
 
Weil, R.L., (1966). The N-person Prisoner's Dilemma: Some theory and a computer 
oriented approach. Behavioral Science 11, 227–233. 
 
Wiener, J.L., (1993). What makes People Sacrifice their freedom for the good of their 
community? Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 12(2), 244-251. 
 
Winett, Richard A. and Ester, Peter (1983).  Behavioral Science and energy conservation: 
conceptualizations, strategies, outcomes, energy policy applications. Journal of Economic 
Psychology 3, 203-229 North-Holland. 
  
57 
 
Internet links 
 
 
European Environmental Agency 
http://ims.eionet.europa.eu/ 
  
Eurostat by European Commission 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ 
 
Global Action Plan Organization 
http://www.globalactionplan.com 
 
UK EcoTeams Program 
http://ecoteams.org.uk/ 
 
World Energy Outlook by International Energy Agency (IEA) 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/ 
58 
 
APPENDIX. (Performance evaluation of Dutch EcoTeam Program) according to Staats et al. (2004). 
  
59 
 
 
  
60 
 
 
